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Abstract 
 
We review and integrate extant knowledge on group-based forecasting, paying special 
attention to the papers included in this special issue of the International Journal of 
Forecasting. We focus on the relative merits of different methods for aggregating 
individual forecasts, the advantages of heterogeneity in group membership, the impact 
of others‟ opinions on group members, and the importance of perceptions of trust. We 
conclude that opinion change after group-based deliberation is most likely to be 
appropriate where group membership is heterogeneous, minority opinion is protected 
from pressure to conform, information exchange between group members has been 
facilitated, and the recipient of advice is able – by reasoning processes – to evaluate 
the reasoning justifying proffered advice. Proffered advice is least likely to be 
accepted where the advisor is not trusted – indicated by having different perceived 
values to the recipient of the advice and being thought to be self-interested. In 
contrast, the outcome of a group-based deliberation is most likely to be accepted when 
there is perceived procedural fairness and the participants in the process are perceived 
as trustworthy. Finally, we broaden our discussion of group-based forecasting to 
include consideration of other group-based methodologies aimed at enhancing 
judgment and decision making. In particular, we discuss the relevance of research on 
small-group decision making, the nature and quality of advice, group-based scenario 
planning, and public engagement processes. From this analysis, we conclude that, in 
medium- to long-term judgemental forecasting, a variety of non-outcome criteria need 
to be considered in the evaluation of alternative group-based methods. 
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Group-based judgmental forecasting: an analysis of extant knowledge and the 
development of priorities for a new research agenda 
 
Group-based forecasting can be achieved in many ways. The simplest is to average 
individual opinions and take the achieved figure as the forecast. Alternatively, 
individuals can meet to discuss the issue in groups – either with or without some 
formal structure to the process. Unstructured group processes are historically typical, 
and seen as a benchmark for judging the performance of structured methods. Research 
has demonstrated how various social factors can undermine good forecasting (and 
decision making in general) in unstructured groups, and hence identified the need to 
somehow control human interaction to pre-empt or ameliorate these factors. Within 
one such structured-interaction technique - the Nominal Group Technique (NGT) - 
individuals first make personal forecasts, then the group members meet to discuss the 
forecast problem, and finally the individuals are given the opportunity to revise their 
earlier forecasts (Van de Ven & Delbecq, 1974). The average of these revised 
opinions can be taken as the group forecast. The structure of the Delphi technique is 
similar to that of the NGT – with the exception that the group members exchange 
their initial forecasts anonymously with other group members and are given the 
opportunity to revise their individual forecasts over several Delphi rounds, with the 
final round average taken as the group forecast (Rowe, Wright, & Bolger, 1991). 
Other group–based methods include role-playing – in which individuals simulate the 
interaction of groups in conflict situations in order to understand/predict how the 
conflict is likely to resolve itself (Green, 2002). Recently, prediction markets have 
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been studied to see if the evolving monetary-derived predictions - produced by self-
interested participants - are accurate (Berg, Nelson, & Rietz, 2008).  
 
The structured methods vary in terms of the amount and type of information that is 
exchanged between group members and the process by which the information 
exchange is managed. The interaction of these aspects ultimately impacts upon the 
degree to which the “advice” of others is integrated with the group members‟ own 
opinions. Another important feature affecting the quality of forecasts produced by the 
different methods is the extent to which group membership is relatively homogeneous 
or heterogeneous. Finally, some group-based methods are more acceptable to group 
members than others – a practical aspect that is often overlooked in choosing which 
forecasting method to use in any particular situation.  
 
In this article, we integrate the contributions of the authors in this special issue of 
International Journal of Forecasting toward addressing these key themes in group-
based forecasting research, before summarising some general issues for future 
research to consider. Finally, we contextualise the current forecasting research with 
respect to other research areas of relevance. We first consider the issue of aggregating 
individual forecasts. 
 
Aggregating individual forecasts 
In the first article, Kerr & Tindale (2011) focus on how to aggregate individual 
opinions to achieve an accurate group-based judgment. They distinguish between 
judgment in intellective tasks, in which deduction of the (already-existing) truth is the 
focus of attention, and judgmental forecasting, in which the forecasters can only 
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explain and defend their judgments, since the outcome has not yet occurred. This 
review suggests that pre-existing majority opinions generally determine group 
consensus decisions in judgmental forecasting tasks, arguing that only in intellective 
tasks, where those group members who favour the correct answer can explain or 
demonstrate why they are correct, is a correct minority likely to be persuasive. 
Because of the disproportionate power of majority opinion to determine the 
subsequent group position in judgmental forecasting tasks, Kerr and Tindale argue 
that only those aggregation methods that facilitate information exchange between 
group members are likely to be beneficial over-and-above a statistical averaging of 
prior opinions. Such information exchange in both face-to-face groups and in 
structured group interaction – such as in Delphi and nominal groups – provides the 
enabling conditions for group members to recognise errors in justifications of 
judgments. Delphi has the advantage of attenuating any social anxiety about 
publically identifying other group members‟ errors. However, face-to-face groups 
may enhance individual task motivation if individual effort and accuracy is 
identifiable. Both face-to-face groups and Delphi can, under the right circumstances, 
provide perceived procedural fairness to all group members who participate, whilst 
Delphi can protect a minority from group pressure to conform to the majority 
viewpoint to preserve group harmony – since, within unstructured groups, social 
goals, such as maintaining group harmony, may conflict with generating the best 
possible judgmental forecast. 
 
In the next section, we focus on the usefulness of having heterogeneous group 
membership. As we shall see, hetrogeneity can be enhanced by role-playing. 
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The advantages of heterogeneity in group membership 
The article by Yaniv (2011) reports an empirical study on susceptibility to framing 
effects as a measure of judgment quality. Yaniv labelled as homogeneous those 
groups made up of individuals that had been assigned to the same framing 
manipulation within a version of the Kahneman and Tversky‟s classic Asian Disease 
problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). By contrast, the heterogeneous groups were 
made up of individuals with a mix of prior frames for a formally identical decision 
problem. Yaniv demonstrated that subsequent discussion within the two types of 
group led to either (i) intensification of framing bias in the homogeneous groupings 
and (ii) attenuation of framing bias in the heterogeneous groupings. He argues that the 
invalid consensus in homogeneous groupings may serve to increase group-based 
confidence but decrease judgmental accuracy. From this perspective, assignment of 
different role-playing responsibilities to individuals can artificially create useful 
heterogeneity and thus attenuate conformity to spurious majority opinion.  
 
Onkal, Lawrence, & Sayim (2011) follow up such a suggestion in their own study of 
“modified consensus groups” – where individual group members role-play functional 
specialists in marketing, production, and forecasting. In their study, these specialist 
role-holders provided independent individual forecasts that were then statistically 
averaged. Participants were instructed to act out their assigned roles as they believed 
these would be realised in real-life.  The experimental materials were sets of time-
series data for product sales. A pure model-based statistical forecast was also 
provided to the group for discussion and, finally, the role-players were asked to accept 
or adjust this model-based prediction to reach a finally-agreed group-based forecast. 
Onkal, Lawrence, and Sayim reached the overall conclusion that this group-based 
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process tended to improve on the accuracy of both (i) the statistical average of the 
individual-member forecasts and (ii) the pure model-based forecast.  
 
Green & Armstrong‟s (2011) article studies the worth of inviting individuals to “stand 
in the other person‟s shoes”. Would this invective give those individuals useful 
insights into the quality of their initial intuitive judgments?  Green and Armstrong‟s 
focus was on forecasting the outcomes of conflict situations - with participants 
instructed to indicate “which decision you think that each party in the situation would 
prefer to be made and how likely is it that each party‟s decision will actually occur”.  
But such invective to engage in “role-thinking” proved no more accurate than 
guessing the outcomes of the conflict situations – even for a range of non-
undergraduate („expert‟) respondents. In contrast, when students were required to 
become more engaged with the conflict situations - by “role-playing” simulated 
interactions between participants in the conflicts – the predictive accuracy of the post-
role participants‟ judgements reached 90%. 
 
All three of these studies therefore speak in one way or another to the need for 
heterogeneity in groups to aid forecasting – and of the value of using role-playing to 
create artificial heterogeneity when this does not exist. 
 
In the next section, we turn our focus to the impact of others‟ opinions (i.e., advice) 
on opinion revision. Most of the research has been conducted within the Judge-
Advisor System (hereafter, JAS) paradigm (Sniezek, 1992) which simulates Advisors 
who give information to others acting as Judges (who are ultimately accountable for a 
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judgment or forecast).  Hence, the decision to use or discard the opinions of others is 
that of the Judge. 
 
The impact of others‟ opinions 
Soll & Mannes (2011) note the well-documented finding that judges often overweight 
their own opinions relative to the advice of another (when the single advisor offers 
simple numerical advice) – so called egocentric discounting. In such instances, the 
averaging of one‟s own opinion and that of the advisor would often have led to 
greater accuracy. However, as Soll and Mannes note, when the experimental task 
instead focuses on combining the opinions of others, the relative weights attached in 
such combination tasks tend to be less biased.  One explanation of the overweighting 
of one‟s own opinion is that the reasons for one‟s own opinions are, perhaps, richer 
and more salient than those of the advisor – where the reasons for proffered advice are 
seldom part of the experimental paradigm. For example, in the few JAS studies where 
non-numerical justification of numerical advice has been made available to 
participants, such justification of advice has been impoverished and superficial. In 
Van Swol & Sniezek (2001), advisors gave their recommendations as to which 
answers to multiple-choice items were correct. The advisors were free to elaborate on 
their recommendations by writing comments that would be seen by the judge.  In the 
minority of instances where advisors elaborated upon their recommendations, such 
elaborations amounted to little more than comments such as „I‟m definite about this‟, 
or „This is a guess‟ (p.297).   In their own empirical study, Soll and Mannes 
manipulated both the task of revising one‟s own opinion and the task of combining 
the opinions of others - within a single experiment. As these authors note, statistical 
averaging performs best when both the probability of detecting someone with true 
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expertise is low, where differences in expertise are also low, and where errors in 
judgments are randomly distributed. Further, in many (laboratory and real) situations 
experts are not easily identified and so the advantage of averaging advice - over 
picking a single advisor - is increased. In their empirical study, Soll and Mannes 
operationalized “advice” by presenting numerical values on four cues that were 
purportedly used by an advisor in making judgments of a focal numerical variable. 
However, note that Soll and Mannes did not utilize verbal justifications or rationales 
underpinning these predictions. The authors found that participants approached the 
dual tasks of revision of their own opinions and the combination of the opinions of 
others in different ways. Their analysis revealed that the obtained egocentric 
discounting in opinion revision was not caused by respondents giving more credibility 
to their own opinions than the opinions of others. Additionally, respondents did not 
rate themselves as more accurate in their judgments than their advisors. 
 
Van Swol (2011) focuses on the distinction between intellective and judgmental tasks, 
discussed earlier, and argues that people are more likely to accept advice on 
intellective tasks where the true answer is already known. This is because, she argues, 
people seek out accuracy in answering intellective problems and an advisor may be 
able to demonstrate the correctness of their advice. By contrast, in judgmental tasks – 
where the true outcome or answer is not known at the time of the judgment - the 
degree of trust placed in the advisor is more important for acceptance of proffered 
advice. If the advisor is perceived as sharing similar values to oneself, then trust 
increases - and so does acceptance of advice. By contrast, in intellective tasks, high 
advisor confidence tends to lead to increasing trust in the proffered advice.  Van Swol 
argues that, in judgmental forecasting tasks, advisors are likely to differ in their 
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advice and so a potentially useful cue that may be used to differentiate advisors is the 
degree to which an advisor shares the values of the client. In her empirical study, she 
found that advisors spontaneously provided much additional information in a task 
where the advice was focussed on which movie the client would find enjoyable. She 
argues that this unstructured material would likely help establish common values and 
thus increase trust in the proffered advice. 
 
Jodlbauer & Jonas (2011) investigate the influence of perceptions of an advisor‟s self-
interested intentions on the client‟s (i.e., advisee‟s) own intention to accept proffered 
advice. As these authors note, the most-studied characteristics of the advisor have 
been perceived expertise, reputation, and confidence associated with proffered advice. 
But clients, these authors argue, know that the advisor has an advantage in knowledge 
but are also aware that advisors may be self-interested and so untrustworthy. Using a 
simple experimental manipulation, Jodlbauer and Jonas varied whether an advisor 
introduced himself as either a representative from a not-for-profit organization or a 
for-profit organization. The student clients placed less trust in both the ability and the 
integrity of the for-profit advisor. 
 
In structured group processes, such as Delphi, the degree to which advisors (i.e. other 
group members) share common values and are to be trusted in their opinions has not 
been a focus of research. Recall that forecasts and opinions are shared anonymously 
in Delphi applications. However, recently, issues to do with procedural justice and 
trust have been raised (and see also the studies above) and it is to this issue that we 
turn next. 
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The importance of perceptions of trust  
In many real-world settings, there are additional complexities to conducting research 
– and to answering the fundamental question of how to obtain a „good‟ forecast or 
decision. Two studies in this Special Issue are noteworthy in their reporting of large-
scale real-world interventions in organizations with a future-orientated focus, and 
these exemplify some of the research difficulties, as well as the definitional difficulty 
of identifying a „good‟ forecast. That is, when one cannot easily control the 
experimental environment and use forecast accuracy as a criterion measure – then 
how can one judge the merits of a group-based process?  
 
Landeta & Barrutia (2011) utilize a version of the Delphi process within a policy 
development setting that incorporated specific enhancements to the Delphi technique 
to help achieve a process that was of high-quality and acceptable to the varied 
members of a professional bureaucracy. In particular, the authors wished to attenuate 
any potential conflict between nominal group members. Their case study documents a 
process intervention that (i) maximises the perceived importance of participation, (ii) 
minimises the possibilities of manipulation of outcomes by powerful individuals, (iii) 
facilitates the exchange of reasoned justifications for the divergent opinions existing 
in the professional bureaucracy. In this way, the process variation created trust and a 
sense of procedural justice – such that participants were willing to accept the 
consequences of the Delphi yield. Interestingly, Landeta and Barrutia‟s method for 
the selection of interest-group representatives for membership of the Delphi panel 
also establishes that those representatives share similar values to their electors and 
thus, by implication, share the trust of their electors to represent the electors‟ interests. 
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Klenk & Hickey (2011) present another variation on the Delphi technique to enhance 
group-based deliberations. Their focus is on a method development to aid integration 
of group-based knowledge and to map areas of both consensus and dissent – whilst 
minimizing any negative group dynamics during deliberations of viewpoints.  Using 
“concept mapping” techniques, their case study illustrates a practical tool to document 
both shared and individual viewpoints in both knowledge and values. Such a tool may 
be particularly useful, given the importance – previously discussed – of group 
members being able to provide rationales/justifications of their forecasts in order to 
aid other group members in assessing the quality of proffered advice. As with Landeta 
and Barrutia, the merits of this method were largely assessed through the use of post-
event questionnaires seeking the opinions of participants about the process. After all, 
a process that is unacceptable to its participants is unlikely to have much impact – 
hence acceptance would seem an important additional criterion for judging forecast 
process quality, and acceptance appears to be closely linked to perceived  „trust‟ in the 
purveyors of advice. 
 
We next turn to study the adequacy of group-based processes in another “naturalistic” 
decision setting – that of selecting the best research papers and research applications. 
 
Naturalistic decision making in Academia 
Benda & Engles (2011) take an unusual – yet actually highly salient – perspective on 
group-based forecasting. They focus on the operation of the peer review process in 
both the selection of academic manuscripts for journal publication and in the selection 
of grant applications for research funding – arguing that in each case, what 
editors/reviewers are doing is attempting to forecast the success of a paper or project 
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(as might be indicated by, for example, a paper‟s future citations). They argue that 
inter-referee agreement is not at all important for valid selection – again, seeming to 
indicate the importance of heterogenous group membership. The key, to Benda and 
Engles, is that each knowledgeable referee should produce a credible review. Low 
inter-referee agreement can underpin subsequent strong internal validity of the 
reviewing process because a lack of agreement by knowledgeable referees can act to 
discourage superficial vote-counting. Dissensus should be resolved by equally 
knowledgeable journal editors and grant-awarding panels, who should seek to 
understand why disagreements between credible referees exist. Benda and Engles 
identify and describe tension in valid peer review processes and go on to show that, 
without such tension, genuinely innovative research papers and proposals may be 
rejected. Scientific revolutions and paradigm shifts may encounter resistance when 
research papers or research proposals are evaluated by groups - compared to research 
that presents additional increments to existing paradigm-based knowledge. Thus both 
vote counting and averaging of opinions may attenuate the insights provided by an in-
the-minority reviewer. As Benda and Engles point out, groups can be less-than-
optimal users of information that is not already generally shared amongst the group 
membership. As a remedy, these authors advocate that individual referees – who are 
credible and knowledgeable - should have the occasional power to declare the 
unilateral acceptance of a research-based paper or research proposal. 
 
But, which of the methods of unstructured and structured group-based judgmental 
forecasting is best? It is to this issue that we next turn. 
 
Comparison of group-based forecasting methods 
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Graefe & Armstrong (2011) compare the accuracy of unstructured face-to-face groups 
with three structured methods: (i) nominal groups, (ii) Delphi, and (iii) prediction 
markets. Their task was the quantitative estimation of ten almanac quantities, such as 
the percentage of the US population aged over 65 years in 2000. Overall, they found 
few differences between the four methods, but all of the three structured group 
interaction methods improved over the group members‟ individual prior estimates. 
Importantly, only the Delphi method improved over the statistical averaging of the 
group members‟ prior opinions. However, as Graefe and Armstrong note, their 
“intellective” estimation task was impoverished in that participants would, likely, be 
unable to share information that would be of use to aid improvements in the 
judgments of other group members. Interestingly, the study‟s participants expressed 
an attitudinal preference for group processes that involved face-to-face synchronous 
contact with other group members over participation in either Delphi or prediction 
markets. 
 
Summary of key findings in the Special Issue papers 
From the papers discussed in the preceding paragraphs we suggest that an individual‟s 
opinion change after group deliberation is most likely to be appropriate where: 
 
1. Group membership is heterogeneous. Artificial heterogeneity can and should 
be achieved by role-playing rather than role-thinking. 
2. Minority opinion is protected from majority pressure to conform – which 
might best be achieved through anonymity of participants‟ judgments. 
3. Information exchange between group members has been facilitated such that 
errors in opinions can be recognised as such. The addition of novel approaches 
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such as concept mapping (Klenk & Hickey, 2011) might help with this 
explication. 
4.  The advisee is able – by reasoning processes - to evaluate the reasoning 
underpinning the proffered advice (again highlighting the possible value of 
reason-decomposition approaches - such as concept mapping). 
 
Proffered advice is least likely to be accepted (whether that advice is appropriate or 
not) when: 
 
1. The advisor is perceived to have different values to the advisee. 
2. The advisor is thought to be self-interested. 
3.  The advisor is not trusted (which is liable to be related to a degree to having 
different values and being self-interested). 
4. The advisor(s) are in the minority. 
5. The advisor(s) are not able to justify recommendations made – such as when 
advice is given in numerical form only. 
6. Advisors express little confidence in their opinions. 
 
In contrast, the outcome of a group-based deliberation is most likely to be accepted 
when: 
 
1. There is perceived procedural fairness to the group-based process. 
2. The participants in a group-based process are perceived to be trustworthy – as 
indicated by a commonality of values with the advisees and a lack of self-
interest in the advice proffered. 
16 
 
3. There is a sizable majority favouring the prediction or outcome. 
 
In the next sections, we broaden our discussion of group-based forecasting to evaluate 
other group-based methodologies to enhance judgment and decision making. We 
draw out implications for improving group-based forecasting. 
 
Group decision making 
Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan (1986) discuss approaches to engender debate and 
evaluation of decisions in management teams. They differentiate (i) dialectical inquiry 
and (ii) devil‟s advocacy. Both methods systematically introduce conflict and debate 
by using sub-groups that role-play. In dialectical inquiry, the subgroups develop 
opposing alternatives and then come together to debate their assumptions and 
recommendations. In devil‟s advocacy, one subgroup offers a proposal, while the 
other plays devil‟s advocate, critically probing all elements and recommendations in 
the proposal. Both methods encourage groups to generate alternative courses of action 
and minimise tendencies towards premature agreement or convergence on a single 
alternative. Both methods also lead to a more critical evaluation of assumptions by 
providing mechanisms for encouraging dissent whilst at the same time fostering a 
high-level of understanding of the final group decision. Nevertheless, these role-
played, conflict-enhancing, interventions for improving decision making need to be 
focussed on factual information because personalities can, inappropriately, become 
the focus of discussion. Schweiger, Sandberg, & Rechner (1989) compared both 
techniques to a non-adversarial approach where decisions were simply discussed with 
the aim of achieving a consensus amongst group members. Questionnaire ratings by 
group participants found that the two conflict-based approaches were rated higher in 
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terms of producing better recommendations and better questioning of assumptions.  
Formalizing and legitimizing conflict can thus enhance perceptions of the quality of 
the outcome of group decision making. However, whilst conflict can improve 
perceived decision quality, it may weaken the ability of the group to work together in 
the future if the role-playing is not sensitively managed.  Also, as Nemeth, Brown, & 
Rogers (2001) document, authentic minority dissent, when correctly managed, is 
superior to role-playing interventions in stimulating a greater search for information 
on all sides of an issue. But, generally, the authentic dissenter is disliked even when 
she/he has been shown to stimulate better thought processes. However, Nemeth & 
Chiles (1998) showed that the persistent authentic dissenter, while not liked, can be 
admired and respected. Also, it must be recognised that implementation of decisions 
rests on securing the subsequent cooperation of involved parties (as highlighted by 
several of the papers in this special issue – e.g. Landeta & Barrutia, 2011) and so 
affective personal criticism invoked in the prior critical debate will be dysfunctional. 
 
As we have discussed, in a forecasting context, an understanding of the likely 
outcomes of conflicts can be invoked by the use of role-playing the interactions of the 
conflicted parties to a dispute (Green & Armstrong, 2011). However, the focus on 
critique and debate that are entailed in dialectical inquiry and devil‟s advocacy has not 
been a prior topic of research in group-based forecasting. For example, the work of 
Yaniv (2011) and Onkal et al (2011) promotes the inclusion of heterogeneity of 
opinions rather than the structuring of dissent. We advocate that methods which 
invoke critique and dissent should now become such a research focus. 
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The next section of this paper reviews research on the acceptability of advice in 
contexts other than JAS or Delphi. As we shall see, justifications for proffered advice 
have been shown to be a crucial component of the advice‟s subsequent acceptability. 
 
Acceptability of advice  
Expert systems capture the reasoning of experts within computer systems that can 
then act to replicate the expert‟s decision making. Often such systems are used by 
less-expert decision makers as an aid to decision making. Arnold, Clark, Collier, 
Leech, & Sutton (2006) found that novice users of expert systems tend to accept 
systems‟ recommendations, while more-expert users have a stronger interest in 
examining the explanations that the systems generate for particular recommendations. 
As such, expert users are interested in comparing the recommendations and 
underpinning reasoning of the systems with their own judgment. In fact, this focus on 
evaluation and verification may be a precondition for acceptance of systems by more-
expert users. 
 
Apart from the use of expert systems, statistical models can be used to automate 
decision making, or aid decision makers to make decisions. In the USA, a quarter of a 
million people are admitted unnecessarily to hospital each year with suspected heart 
failure. Yet, using seven predictive indicators (four based on quantifications of a 
patient‟s medical history and three being summary measures of electrocardiogram 
tests), Corey & Merenstein (1987) developed a quantitative linear regression model 
that was correct 85% of the time. Because of its predictive success, use of this 
decision aid was made mandatory for physicians in one major hospital. However, 
after some time, its use was made a voluntary choice. From then on, the linear model 
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was used to aid diagnosis of only 3% of patients with suspected heart failure. Why did 
this very effective decision aid not get consulted more often?  
 
Seick & Arkes (2005), in a study of decision aid neglect, found that decision-makers 
who had access to the statistical equation underpinning an effective decision aid often 
didn‟t bother to examine the workings of the method. The tendency was for the 
decision-makers to rely on their own judgment and, later, report that they performed 
better on the prediction task than the advice offered by the decision aid – although the 
decision aid actually outperformed their intuitive judgments. One participant in the 
study commented: „… the statistical equation gave me more confidence if it was 
similar to my original guess. If it was different, I went along with my gut instinct 
rather than use the equation. If I had absolutely no idea, I went with what the equation 
gave me‟. 
 
In fact, people are much more likely to follow a recommendation that comes from an 
expert, for example a physician, rather than one that comes from a statistical model. 
Expert systems that provide the user with explanations of the advice given are more 
likely to be heeded than the unexplained, although accurate, predictions of linear 
models. This result bears comparison with the previously discussed research in 
forecasting (Kerr & Tindale, 2011) that emphasizes that the  justifications for 
proffered advice from other group members needs to be made as explicit as possible, 
in order to have any influence on opinion change. We develop discussion of this issue 
in the next section. 
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Extending study of the reasons underpinning proffered advice 
We have had a longstanding concern with the nature of information exchange 
between participants in nominal groups doing forecasting tasks (see Rowe & Wright, 
1996), and in particular, the need to understand the processes leading to 
judgment/forecast change in individuals within such groups (and interacting groups 
more widely) (Rowe, Wright &  Bolger, 1991). That is, what factors are responsible 
for leading participants to accept others‟ judgments or forecasts and amend their own 
to some degree? Some of the papers in this special issue have provided further 
evidence of a need for the information being exchanged to possess certain qualities – 
including indicating shared values between information provider and recipient. 
Information that leads a recipient to trust the information provider, or that indicates 
their expertise (at least in certain tasks – perhaps intellective moreso than judgmental) 
is also important. However, what is it about the content and type of forecast 
justifications and challenges that induces participants to change their positions, and 
thus potentially improve forecasts? We had hoped that this special issue would flush 
out a number of empirical papers addressing this topic, but that has not been the case - 
and this research area remains under-explored. 
 
 
However, some early research spoke to this issue, and, we propose, ought to be 
revisited by modern researchers. For example, Brockriede & Ehninger (1960) have 
shown that only a limited number of argument types are, in principle, available to 
people advocating specific propositions or claims – arguments of parallel case, 
analogy, motivation, and authority:    
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In Analogous reasoning, the reason given makes use of our general knowledge of 
relationships between two events in dissimilar situations. For example, if someone is 
trying to estimate the time it will take to drive to a nearby airport, an advisor may 
reason that, “the airport is roughly the same distance away as the shopping mall. 
Therefore, the time it will take to get to the airport will be approximately the same as 
it is to travel to the shopping mall – about 30 minutes”.  
 
Parallel case reasoning involves making use of our knowledge of a previous 
experience of a near identical situation. For example, if someone is trying to estimate 
the time it will take to drive to a nearby airport an advisor may reason that, “it will 
take about 30 minutes to drive to the airport because it took me 30 minutes at the 
same time of day last month”.  
 
Authoritative reasoning involves making use of substantive knowledge. For example, 
“the radio announcer has said that traffic to the airport is heavy today and so I 
estimate that you should add 20 minutes to your journey time”.  
 
Motivational reasoning involves making use of specific insights about people‟s 
motivations or desires. For example, “since you will be in a hurry, then I reckon that 
you can cut five minutes off your usual journey time”. 
 
 
Importantly, whilst reasoning by analogy, parallel case, authority, and motivation are 
available justifications for advice in judgmental tasks, only justification by authority, 
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or expertise, is available as a justification for advice in intellective tasks. Thus, many 
crucial questions remain to be explored and answered. For example, what components 
of advice-giving cause opinion change in the judgmental forecasting of individual 
experts? How is advice evaluated and under what conditions will advice be 
assimilated or discounted? When one expert defers in his or her own opinion to the 
well-argued opinion, or challenge, of another, is this an indicator of the presence of 
valid advice that will improve validity in (the revised) judgmental prediction?  
 
 
In the next section, we focus on another technique that is used by decision makers to 
anticipate the future – scenario planning. We show that stakeholder analysis – akin to 
role-thinking (as discussed earlier - see Green & Armstrong, 2011) - is a component 
of current scenario development practice. 
 
Scenario planning and stakeholder perspectives 
The scenario method explores the complex relationship between social, economic, 
technological, environmental and political factors from multiple perspectives, enables 
sense making of their interactions, and provides a vehicle for the development of 
plausible futures that may impact on the focal organization. 
 
The approach entails some consideration of stakeholder values and actions to add 
realism to already-constructed scenarios. In practice, stakeholder analysis is an 
optional addition to the 'mix' of ingredients; as 'a tool to be used in parallel with the 
scenario process, as and when members of the scenario team find it useful' [van der 
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Heijden, Bradfield, Burt, Cairns, & Wright, 2002, p.219]. Stakeholders include the 
focal organization‟s competitors, customers, regulators, etc.  
 
Wright & Goodwin (2009) have argued for a more intense focus on stakeholder 
analysis within the scenario development process - as the likely actions of 
stakeholders to enhance and preserve their own interests in a particular unfolding 
scenario are thought-through. Such role-thinking assumes that scenario participants 
will be able to put themselves in the shoes of each particular stakeholder grouping 
when this does not involve actual interactions with representatives of such groupings. 
At the same time, stakeholder interests and values may be more subtle than those that 
are obvious on the surface. However, as we have discussed, there is, by contrast, 
evidence that role-playing unfamiliar roles can lead to insights. Green (2002) first 
showed that when university students were asked to role-play the participants in six 
heterogeneous conflict situations, their subsequent group-based resolutions of the 
conflict – or the group-based forecasts of the outcomes of these conflicts – were 
accurate. Intuitively, it would seem that one‟s own experiences of the past resolution 
of conflicts – perhaps as recalled or previously experienced, and including both 
personal and non-personal conflicts – offer a strong guide to the prediction/resolution 
of the outcomes of novel conflicts. In other words, if the resolutions of conflicts are, 
generally, the result of the operation of basic human motivations and value systems, 
then the conditions for reasoning by analogy – and acting by analogy - are favourable 
(Wright, 2002). Our current analysis now leads us to advocate that scenario 
development should incorporate role–playing of stakeholders - rather than use less-
experiential role-thinking activities. 
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Further, Cairns, Sliwa, & Wright (in press) advocate the interrogation of the scenario 
stories from the perspective of the full range of involved and affected actors through 
application of Flyvbjerg‟s question framework for phonetic inquiry. They advocate 
structuring this analysis using a matrix that lists the developed scenarios along the top 
row of a matrix (Where are we going?) and the range of identified actor groups down 
the left-hand column. Within each box that marks an intersection of a scenario and an 
actor group, they suggest considering two issues: (i) the impact of the unfolding future 
on the actor group's interests and values (Is this development desirable?) and (ii) the 
likely action/reaction of the group to the particular unfolding future (What, if 
anything, should we do about it? where „we‟ is the particular actor group). Use of 
role-playing would enable participants to become more sensitised to the plight of each 
of the groups of actors and become aware of the degree of power of action that each 
of them has to preserve or enhance their own interests as a particular scenario unfolds.  
 
We next turn to the presence of potential framing effects in scenario development and, 
following Yaniv (2011), argue for the preservation of heterogeneity in scenario 
development teams. 
 
Scenario planning and heterogeneity of participants 
In most scenario planning exercises, the scenarios are developed by participants from 
within a single organization. It follows that these participants are likely to have a 
homogeneous frame on the nature of the future. One way, in practice, used to counter 
this potential bias is to employ outsiders - so-called „remarkable people‟ – who hold 
minority viewpoints about the future. Such deliberately-invoked diversity is likely to 
reduce frame blindness in the context of a facilitated process intervention within an 
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organization. However, at present, the incorporation of such potential insights is 
unstructured and unevaluated.  
 
Also, in practice, scenario development sometimes involves a scenario team 
composed of representatives from multiple agencies – i.e., the scenario team is 
initially formed from a heterogeneous constituency. Cairns, Wright, Bradfield, van 
der Heijden, & Burt (2006) have argued that the process of scenario planning can 
provide a non-adversarial common viewpoint to unite, what may be, initially-
fragmented groupings. By contrast, in terms of our analysis, the fragmentation should 
instead be conserved – at least until the point when any action response to the 
constructed set of scenarios is debated (see Goodwin & Wright, 2010).  In the more 
usual scenario development activity, conducted within a single organization, the 
conventional process results in the initial development of four skeleton scenarios that 
are then each fleshed-out by one of four sub-groups. But differences, in world-views, 
between these sub-groups are likely to be small.  On our analysis, once a particular 
scenario is fully developed it should then be subjected to adversarial critique by one 
or more of the other subgroups. In this way, also, the systematic introduction of 
conflict and challenge is likely to enhance the quality of the finally-developed 
scenarios. 
 
Finally, we now turn to a discussion of public engagement processes. As we will see, 
evaluation of public engagement methods has direct implications for the evaluation of 
alternative methods for group-based forecasting – in situations where outcome data, 
that can be used for forecast verification, is not available. 
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Public engagement processes 
A contemporary domain in which many of the issues in this special issue are currently 
being played out is that of public engagement in agenda setting and policy making. 
(Though a caveat is needed here, as copious alternative terms have also been used to 
describe this general domain – for example, replacing the prefix „public‟ with 
„stakeholder‟ or „citizen‟ and the suffix „engagement‟ with „communication‟ or 
„consultation‟ or participation‟ e.g. see Rowe & Frewer, 2005, for a discussion of 
definitional nightmares). In essence, public (or stakeholder... etc etc) engagement is 
the process of involving a wider range of perspectives into some decisional or agenda-
setting (or even forecasting) process than would traditionally be the case. The origins 
of this zeitgeist are difficult to pin down, but it has been associated with a number of 
major failures in the traditional decide-announce-defend approach to policy making, 
in which the public and other stakeholders would simply be the recipients of 
communications about the derived policy (developed by governmental agencies, 
legislators, etc.).  
 
Associated with this has been a decline in public trust in government, politicians, and 
scientists, in many democratic societies over the last few decades (e.g. De Marchi & 
Ravetz, 1999; Laird, 1989). Whereas in the past a compliant public might have 
accepted what governments claim as best policy, or scientists as „the truth‟, nowadays 
there appears to be more dispute, disbelief and distrust, with the public not behaving 
as their traditional advisors would recommend.  The ideal of engagement is that, by 
involving the public (or its representatives, or other excluded stakeholders) that, 
somehow, trust will be regained and, also, that decisions may be improved - because 
of the addition of lay knowledge and perspectives.  
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The way in which input is gained from this wider constituency is invariably through 
group-based approaches (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, list over 100 „methods‟ for doing 
this). The parallels to the topic of this special issue are thus a) the assumed benefits of 
having heterogenous input, and b) the importance of a process being perceived as 
acceptable to its participants for it to have utility (e.g. Webler, 1995). Indeed, the 
value of public engagement is seen by many as self-evident, which has hindered 
attempts at asking critical evaluative questions, such as does public engagement 
work? Are policies derived through this approach actually „better‟ than those achieved 
through traditional approaches? Which of the various methods of engagement work 
best in which situation? And indeed, what do we mean by „work‟?  
 
 It is in this latter point that alternative methods of public engagement are confronted 
with similar practical evaluative problems to those involving medium- to long-term 
forecasting – where there is the absence of the possibility of using accuracy to assess 
forecast quality. More recently, the issue of evaluation has risen up many agendas – 
particularly as authorities have realised a need to justify their expenditures on 
expensive engagement processes. And here, possibly, might be some lessons for the 
forecasting domain. Evaluation research has generally sought to assess two main 
aspects of engagement processes for quality – the first being process acceptability to 
the participants involved, and the second being the quality of the process used in 
enacting engagement. Various criteria have been forwarded to measure acceptability 
(see Rowe & Frewer, 2000), such as process transparency, independence of the 
facilitation of a process from the event sponsors‟ potentially vested interests, and the 
appropriate representativeness of participants. Process quality has been assessed 
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according to criteria such as the availability of appropriate resources to complete the 
task (including time resources), the utilisation of relevant decision-structuring 
processes, and the adequate and full definition of the task. It is possible that these 
criteria (or others from this domain) might be useful in the evaluation of medium- to 
long-term forecasting processes – using acceptability and process quality measures as 
surrogates for unobtainable validity measures. Of particular relevance is the 
consideration of what is an adequately „representative‟ set of participants. The 
findings from several studies in this issue have highlighted the importance of 
heterogenous group membership – but research in the public engagement domain 
would prompt forecasters to think further in terms of exactly who those heterogenous 
members should be, and if they are to be experts in certain domains, would ask the 
question – what do we mean by an „expert‟, and how might we measure and confirm 
this (c.f., Rowe & Wright, 2001)? All these issues now deserve a place on our future 
research agenda for group-based judgemental forecasting.  
 
Conclusion 
The papers in this issue reveal that group-based forecasting is a complex, multi-
faceted issue. One of the distinctions made in several of the papers is between 
intellective and judgmental (forecasting) tasks – with some evidence put forward that 
different factors may be more or less relevant in determining the output of groups 
considering each task type. In group-based forecasting practice, there are likely to be 
aspects of both of these types of tasks, with experts bringing factual knowledge to 
bear to support their forecast and trying to persuade others of the correctness of their 
special knowledge (and thereby of their own expertise). 
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 But there is a third significant component to real-world forecasting that is also 
touched upon here, particularly in the papers of Landeta & Barrutia (2011) and Klenk 
& Hickey (2011), and that is the policy making angle (after all, the „Policy Delphi‟ is 
a distinctly named variant of one of the main group-based forecasting techniques). We 
must ever remember that forecasts are rarely, in themselves, disinterested and 
innocent products of the group process in which they are produced. Forecasts – in 
non-laboratory settings – often serve a purpose in policy making. If forecasts are for 
hoped-for outcomes, they may encourage policy making to foster their occurrence; if 
forecasts are for feared outcomes, then they may encourage the forecasters (and 
policy makers – who may or may not comprise the same set of individuals) toward 
actions that might undermine the forecast. And this reality should cause us to 
reconsider how we evaluate forecasts. In laboratory studies – particularly using 
almanac questions (intellective tasks) and short-term forecasts – forecasting accuracy 
can be determined, and therefore the factors responsible for a particular group-based 
forecasting method producing a better forecast can be investigated. But in medium- to 
long-term forecasts, other criteria need to be brought to bear in assessing whether a 
particular group-based process has value.  
 
In summary, we believe that this special issue on group-based forecasting does 
advance our knowledge of the domain in a number of ways. But there are others paths 
we might follow, and we urge the research community to consider them. 
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